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Legislative Issue 
This issue summarizes new laws related to child maltreatment which were enacted this year by the 
South Carolina legislature. The two-year legislative session was concluded, so any pending bills will not be 
carried forward. The 114th General Assembly will convene on January 9, 2001. A date for pre-filing of new 
bills has not yet been set. 
Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies 
The Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act establishes procedures and protections for parents who 
relinquish custody of an infant at a hospital or hospital outpatient facility. An infant is a person not more than 
thirty days old. Under this Act, which became effective June 14, 2000, hospitals must take temporary 
physical custody of an infant who is voluntarily left at the facility by a person who does not express an intent 
to return. A court order is not required, and necessary medical care must be provided. The hospital must 
inquire as to the infant's medical history and identity of the child's parent, excluding the person leaving the 
infant. The person who leaves the infant at a hospital is not required to disclose his or her identity. The 
hospital must also notify DSS after taking temporary physical custody of an infant. Hospitals and staff are 
immune from liability if they comply with all sections of the Act. 
Upon being notified that a hospital has taken physical custody of an infant, DSS immediately has legal 
custody of the child. This does not constitute emergency protective custody, and the provisions of S.C. 
Code Ann. §20-7-610 do not apply. Rather, additional procedures are spelled out in the Act. 
DSS must contact the State Law Enforcement Division to ascertain that the infant has not been 
reported as missing. DSS must publish notice and send a news release to the broadcast and print media 
which describes the infant and specifies the date and time of a hearing, at which anyone wishing to assert 
parental rights must to do so. Notice must also be sent to any person identified as the child's parent. 
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Within forty-eight hours after obtaining legal custody of a child, DSS must file a petition alleging that 
the infant has been abandoned and that termination of parental rights is in his or her best interests. A 
permanency planning hearing is held between thirty and sixty days after the obtainment of legal custody. 
If the court approves the plan of termination of parental rights at this hearing, the order must require DSS 
to file a petition for termination within ten days. 
A person who leaves an infant at a hospital cannot be criminally prosecuted if that person is a parent 
or is acting at the direction of a parent, and the infant is left in the physical custody of an employee of the 
hospital. This does not prevent prosecution for otherwise harming the child however. The Safe Haven for 
Abandoned Babies Act is codified at S.C. Code Ann. §20-7-85. 
Kinship Foster Care 
A Kinship Foster Care Program is established under the South Carolina Department of Social 
Services pursuant to Act No. 219, which became effective February 25, 2000. This program applies only 
to children who have been removed from their homes and are in the care, custody, or guardianship of DSS. 
Neither informal kinship care nor private custody actions involving relatives are affected by this legislation. 
Under the provisions of this Act, DSS will assist relatives in becoming licensed as kinship foster 
parents when it is in the child's best interests to be placed with a relative, or when a relative contacts DSS 
about providing placement for a child. Relatives must also be informed of payments and services available 
to kinship foster parents. Once licensed, relatives receive payments at the full foster care rate. 
A full kinship care licensing study is required prior to approval as a kinship foster parent. All residents 
of the kinship household who are age eighteen or older must undergo state and federal fingerprint reviews 
for criminal history. Kinship foster parents must be at least twenty-one years old. DSS may waive this 
requirement if the prospective kinship care provider is at least eighteen and a partner or spouse living in the 
home is twenty-one or older. 
Kinship foster parents are to be notified of court proceedings, as are other foster parents. They also 
are to be involved in the development of the child's permanent plan and other plans for services. If the child's 
permanent plan calls for custody or guardianship to the kinship foster parent, then DSS must provide 
information about adoption, including financial benefits, to the kinship foster parent. 
DSS Administrative Hearings 
The South Carolina Department of Social Services promulgated new regulations concerning its 
administrative hearings, effective July 28, 2000. The regulations permit the Office of Administrative Hearing 
officers to let children testify, and to make accommodations for their testimony if needed. Also, the new 
regulations allow children's out of court statements to be used in the hearings, if they comply with S.C. Code 
Ann. §19-1-180(Supp. 1999). Contested cases of the removal offoster children from foster homes will no 
longer be heard by the Administrative Law Judge Division but by DSS Office of Administrative Hearings. 
t 
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Criminal Offenses 
On May 1, Governor Hodges signed a bill increasing solicitors' ability to respond to physical 
maltreatment of children. Act No. 261 makes two significant changes to charging statutes available when 
a person kills or seriously injures a child. 
First, the Act creates a new offense for the infliction of great bodily injury upon a child. To be codified 
at S.C. Code Ann. §16-3-95, the law defines "great bodily injury" as bodily injury which creates a "substantial 
risk of death or which causes serious or permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ." This new offense is a felony and is punishable by up to twenty 
years incarceration. It is categorized as a violent crime. 
It is also unlawful for a child's parent or guardian, a person cohabitating with the child's parent or 
guardian, or any person responsible for a child's welfare as defined in §20-7-490(5) to knowingly allow the 
infliction of great bodily injury by someone else. This is also a felony and can be punished by up to five years 
imprisonment. 
This statute does not apply to corporal punishment which does not cause great bodily injury. It also 
does not apply to traffic accidents unless the driver recklessly disregarded the safety of others. 
This Act also amended the Homicide by Child Abuse statute so that it applies to anyone who, while 
committing child abuse or neglect, kills a child under the age of eleven. As previously written, the statute 
defined child abuse by referencing the Children's Code, thus limiting its application to a parent, guardian, or 
other person responsible for the child's welfare. The amended section defines child abuse or neglect as "an 
act or omission by any person which causes harm to the child's physical health or welfare". 
Cost of SLED Checks 
Act No. 332, which was approved and effective June 6, 2000, limits the fee that the State Law 
Enforcement Division (SLED) can charge for criminal record searches conducted for charitable organizations. 
If the search is certified by a charitable organization, the fee cannot exceed eight dollars. A charitable 
organization is defined as: (1) a 501 (c)(3) tax exempt organization; (2) a bona fide church, synagogue, or 
mosque; or (3) an organization which has registered under the Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act. This 
provision will benefit the child-serving organizations which require SLED checks of volunteers and staff. 
HIV and Hepatitis B Testing 
Act No. 218, which was effective February 25, 2000, provides that a victim who has been exposed 
to body fluids during a crime may request that the solicitor petition the court to have the defendant tested for 
Hepatitis Band HIV. Upon the request of the victim, or legal guardian of the victim, the solicitor must petition 
the court any time after charges have been brought. This applies to juveniles as well as adults accused of 
crimes. The testing cannot be conducted without a court order. 
To obtain a court order, the solicitor must show the following: (1) That the victim, or victim's guardian, 
has requested the testing; (2) That there is probable cause that the defendant committed the crime; (3) That 
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there is probable cause that body fluids may have been transmitted; and (4) That the defendant received 
notice of the petition and the right to be represented at the hearing. 
Upon obtainment of the court order, the tests must be conducted either by the county health 
department or the detention facility housing the defendant. Persons and entities administering these tests 
in accordance with accepted medical standards are immune from civil and criminal liability. 
If performed prior to conviction or adjudication, results of the tests can only be released to the solicitor, 
who shall notify the victim, victim's attorney, defendant, and defendant's attorney. The solicitor shall also } 
report positive test results to the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) and to the 
correctional facility housing the defendant. The correctional facility shall use this information only for the J 
purpose of providing medical treatment. DHEC must provide counseling to the defendant and, upon request, 
to the victim. 
If the initial HIV test is negative, the court may, upon the victim's request, order follow-up testing to 
be performed at six weeks, three months, and six months after the initial test. An order for follow-up testing 
is terminated if the defendant is acquitted or charges are dismissed. 
The cost of testing is the responsibility of the State. If subsequently convicted or adjudicated 
delinquent, the offender must reimburse the State unless determined to be indigent. Parents of juvenile 
offenders may be required to reimburse the State. 
Results of HIV tests cannot be used as evidence in a criminal trial. However, upon a showing of 
probable cause that the defendant committed the crime, the court may contemporaneously order the 
collection of additional samples, such as blood or saliva, for the purpose of scientific testing, including DNA. 
The results of this scientific testing may be used for evidentiary purposes in court proceedings. 
Service of Legal Documents 
Act No. 360 provides that summons, complaints, or other legal documents can be served on 
Sundays. However, they cannot be served upon persons while attending, or going to or from, a church or 
other religious service on Sunday. 
Case Decisions 
Special Accommodations for Child Witnesses 
In the case of South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Wilson (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 17, 
2000)(Shearouse Adv.Sh. No. 30 at 39) the court of appeals reversed and remanded a family court order 
permitting a 17 -year-old child to testify about improper touching incidents outside the visual presence of her 
father. At the trial, the father was placed in another room, where he could hear the girl's testimony but she 
could not see him. The father had the opportunity to consult with his attorney after direct and cross-
examination. The father objected to this procedure and stated it violated his due process right of 
confrontation. The family court found that the father had abused and neglected the child and his name was 
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The court of ~ppeals noted that usually the right to confrontation only applies in criminal matters, but 
since the result was putting the father's name in the central registry and this could leave a "permanent mark" 
on him, the due process right of confrontation applied in this family court matter. 
The court went on to hold that the family court did not apply the proper procedures in determining 
whether the child could testify outside the presence of her father. The family court did not hear any testimony 
about trauma to the child, if she had to testify in the presence of her father, nor did the father have access 
to counsel while the child was testifying. Also, the appellate court considered the age of the child. The 
statute allowing testimony to be taped or given in closed court session, S.C. Code Ann. §16-3-
1550(E)(Supp.1999), applies to witnesses who are very young or with special needs, and the child in this 
case was 17 years old. 
Although upon first reading this decision might appear to be unfriendly to child witnesses, it actually 
only serves as a reminder that proper procedures must be followed in making special accommodations. In 
following these procedures, as clarified by case law and statutes, the defendant's right of confrontation can 
be balanced with the right of the child to be protected if testifying in front of the defendant will cause severe 
trauma. Evidence should be presented at the hearing to support a finding that the child would be traumatized 
if required to testify without special accommodations. Defendants placed outside of the presence of the 
witness should be able to view and hear the witness, and have continuous access to counsel during the 
testimony. 
Repressed Memory 
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Moriartyv. Garden Sanctuary Church ofGod(S.C.Sup.Ct. filed 
June 26, 2000)(Shearouse Adv.Sh. No. 26 at 9) has permitted an adult to bring a law suit against a church 
run day care center for sexual abuse she alleges to have suffered there as a child. The trial court granted 
summary judgment for the church, finding that the case was not filed in a timely manner. The plaintiff 
appealed and the case was re-instated by the court of appeals in Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of 
God, 334 S.C.150, 511 S.E.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1999). The church appealed to the supreme court, which 
upheld the decision of the court of appeals. The issue before the court was the time frame in which the 
plaintiff had to bring the suit seeking damages for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress, invasion 
of privacy, negligent supervision, and breach of warranty. The plaintiff brought the case within the three-year 
statute of limitations from the time the repressed memories surfaced. The defendant day care center argued 
that she should have brought the suit within one year after reaching the age of 21, since she was a child 
when the alleged incidents occurred. 
The supreme court held that in repressed memory cases, the plaintiff must bring the case "within the 
required period after the date a reasonable person would have regained sufficient memories to discover her 
injury." This is called the discovery rule. The day care center took the position that a 3 or 4-year-old child 
should know that sexual abuse is wrong, and therefore should only have until reaching the age of majority 
plus one year in which to file any lawsuits. The supreme court rejected this argument and noted that, as early 
as the 1800s, the literature contained references to repressed memories. The court goes on to say that 
young children may feel that sexual abuse is wrong, ,but are powerless at that young age to do anything 
about it and may repress those memories. 
The court stated "the discovery rule exists to avoid the harsh and unjust result of closing the court 
room doors to a plaintiff whose 'blameless ignorance' resulted in a failure to pursue a cause of action within 
the limitations period." The case can now proceed to trial. 
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Adoption Consent 
In the case of Hagyv. Pruitt(S.C.Sup.Ct. filed March 20, 2000)(ShearouseAdv.Sh. No. 11 at 18) the 
South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue of setting aside an adoption because the biological 
mother alleged that her consent to the adoption was fraudulently obtained. The court of appeals, in 1998, 
had overturned the family court order setting aside the adoption. Hagy v. Pruitt, 331 S.C. 213, 500 S.E.2d 
168 (Ct. App. 1998). 
A 16-year-old biological mother signed an adoption consent permitting her father and stepmother to 
adopt her child. The mother later contested the adoption and, at the family court hearing, testified that she 
understood her consent was final but said her father threatened her. Her father denied threatening her. Two 
attorneys from different firms testified they advised the mother as to the contents and meaning of the 
consent. The written consent in the case complied with S.C. Code Ann. §20-7-1700 (Supp.1999). The 
family court had held that the adoption should be overturned, and that a guardian ad litem was necessary 
before the mother could sign the consent due to her age. 
Upon Writ of Certiorari to the court of appeals, the supreme court held that the one-year timeframe 
for setting aside an order of adoption does not apply to setting aside an adoption on the ground of extrinsic 
fraud. S.C. Code Ann. §20-7-1800 (Supp. 1999). Extrinsic fraud, as defined by other cases, is fraud that 
influences a person not to present a case or prevents a person from being heard in a court action. The 
supreme court held that the mother's allegation that her consent was fraudulently given was an allegation 
of extrinsic fraud. The court then analyzed the evidence presented at the family court hearing and 
determined that there was not clear and convincing evidence to show that the mother's consent was obtained 
by fraud, so the consent to the adoption was not revocable. 
Further, the supreme court held that the mother did not need a guardian ad litem when she signed 
the consent because a guardian ad litem is appointed in a court action, and the consenting mother is not a 
party to the adoption action. Her consent was also not revocable due to her age, according to the court's 
ruling. 
The court did note that this case is in compliance with the amended version of S.C. Code Ann. §20-7-
1800 (Supp.1999) which was adopted in 1999. The court also noted that, although it was not an issue in this 
case, the doctrine of laches would apply in determining if an action to set aside an adoption is barred 
because it was not timely filed. 
This court upheld this adoption because there was no showing of fraud, but the time frames are 
worrisome. The child was born on August 25, 1991. The final adoption order from family court was issued 
on June 18, 1992. The action to set aside the adoption was filed on December 12, 1994. The court of 
appeals' decision was in 1998 and the supreme court's decision was filed March 20, 2000. This means that 
the legal status of the child was in limbo for eight of her nine years. 
Guardian ad Litem Immunity 
In the case of Falk v. Sadler(S.C. Ct. App. filed June 19, 2000)(Shearouse Adv.Sh. No. 27 at 1) a 
guardjan ad litem in a family court custody case was sued in circuit court for negligence, breach of fiduciary 
duties, and malicious use of the legal process. The case arose from a private divorce and custody action. 
The parties were married and adopted a son. They had a daughter, by a surrogate mother, who was the 
biological child of the husband and was adopted by the wife. During the divorce and custody case, the wife 
requested, with the consent of the husband, that the family court appoint the guardian ad litem. The family 
'f 
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court never issued an order of appointment however. The guardian ad litem recommended that custody 
ofthe daughter be placed with the father and that he be allowed to return to his home in Japan. A property 
and separation agreement permitted the father to have permanent custody of the daughter and the wife 
custody of the son. This agreement was adopted as an order of the court. 
The wife later filed this action in circuit court against the guardian ad litem, stating that the family court 
did not appoint the guardian ad litem and that the guardian ad litem had exceeded her duties. The guardian 
ad litem moved for a judgment on the pleadings citing that she had immunity for all her actions under the 
case of Fleming v. Asbill, 326 S.C. 49, 483 S.E. 2d 751 (1997). The circuit court granted the motion of the 
guardian ad litem and the wife appealed. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. The court of appeals reviewed the Fleming case and noted that immunity only 
applies if the guardian ad litem is acting within the scope of her duties. If a guardian ad litem is exceeding 
the scope of those duties then immunity does not protect the guardian ad litem. The court of appeals stated 
that, since the plaintiff's pleadings alleged that the guardian ad litem exceeded the scope of her duties, this 
raised issues of facts to be decided by the court. 
The wife also raised the issue that there never was an order from the family court appointing the 
guardian ad litem. The court of appeals found this to be immaterial since both parties asked that the 
guardian ad litem be appointed. her recommendations were noted in the pendente lite custody order, and 
her fees were a part of the court order as well. Therefore, the guardian ad litem could raise the immunity 
issue despite having no order of appointment. 
This case serves as a reminder that guardians ad litem are not protected from liability when they act 
beyond the scope of their duties. The court of appeals also stated that a recommendation by a guardian ad 
litem even when against one party is not the basis for a cause of action against the guardian ad litem. 
Grandparent Visitation 
The United State Supreme Court addressed the issue of visitation rights of grandparents in Troxel 
v. Granville, 120 U.S. 2054 (2000). This case concerned a visitation dispute between the paternal 
grandparents of two young girls and their mother. The mother and father were never married but the 
grandparents visited with the girls regularly even after the parents separated. The father of the girls later 
committed suicide. Eventually, the mother remarried and her new husband adopted the girls. 
The paternal grandparents were told by the mother that she wanted to reduce their visits to just one 
· short visit a month, so the grandparents filed for visitation under a Washington state statute. The statute 
allowed any person to petition for visitation rights if it was in the best interests of the child. The mother did 
not oppose the visitation by the grandparents, but wanted it limited to one day per month and special 
holidays. The lower court granted visitation to the grandparents of one weekend per month, a week during 
the summer, and time on their birthdays. · 
The mother appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, which reversed the grandparents' order 
of visitation and dismissed their petition. The grandparents appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, 
which upheld the court of appeals' decision. The grandparents then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The U. S. Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the state court, held that parents have the 
fundamental due process right to the care, custody, and control of their children. The Supreme Court 
recounted numerous cases which have held that the state has no reason to intervene in the childrearing 
decisions of parents unless there is a finding that the parents are unfit. There were no allegations of 
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unfitness here, but only a dispute as to how much visitation the grandparents were entitled to have. 
Therefore, the end result was that the mother and her new husband have the right to decide whether their 
daughters will visit the grandparents at all. 
In South Carolina, grandparents have the right to seek visitation when the parents live separate and 
apart, are divorced, or if one parent is deceased. S.C. Code Ann~ §20-7-420(33)(Supp. 1999). The court 
must find that the visitation is in the best interest of the child and that it does not interfere with the parent/child 
relationship. The court must also consider the relationship between the child and grandparents before the 
filing of the visitation action. 
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